JOLs or RCJs after prejudgment recall (Dougherty et al., 2005) . In contrast to the JOL condition, in the RCJ condition, participants rated their confidence in the accuracy of the target item they had just retrieved. Second, after making their confidence judgment, participants made a binary decision: If given the opportunity, would they choose to restudy the cue-target pair? Assuming that participants use their confidence judgments as the basis of their restudy decisions, participants making RCJs should be better at discriminating items that require further study, compared with participants making JOLs. To assess how RCJs and JOLs may change future study behavior, it is also necessary to compare them with pure study decisions. Therefore, we also included a no-judgment condition in which participants made only the restudy decision.
A critical question regarding the differences between RCJs and JOLs concerns why RCJs are more predictive of future recall than JOLs. One key difference between RCJs and JOLs lies in the conditional distributions of confidence judgments. Figure 1 plots typical distributions of RCJs and JOLs conditional on prejudgment recall accuracy (see Dougherty et al., 2005) . When prejudgment recall is incorrect, the distribution of confidences for RCJs and JOLs are nearly identical, both showing high positive skew. However, when prejudgment recall is correct, the confidence distributions differ considerably, with RCJs showing negative skew and JOLs showing an almost uniform distribution. This pattern explains why RCJs are more predictive of recall: RCJs are more discriminant of correctly recalled items. Thus, we hypothesized that RCJs would lead to more accurate restudy decisions, but only for items for which prejudgment recall is correct.
Specifically, we expected that participants in the RCJ condition would be less likely to select to restudy items that had been correctly retrieved at prejudgment recall relative to those in the JOL condition, because participants making RCJs are more likely to assign high confidence to correctly recalled items than to incorrectly recalled items. We assumed that both types of judgments would improve restudy decisions relative to the no-judgment condition.
Method

Participants
Three hundred forty-six participants were recruited from the University of Maryland subject pool and received course credit for participating. Data were collected for both an initial study and an exact replication. Sample size for both studies was determined a priori to be 50 participants per condition, a sample size comparable with that of a similarly designed experiment (Dougherty et al., 2005) . For the initial study, data collection was stopped when at least 50 participants had completed the study in each of the three randomly assigned conditions. For the replication study, data were collected through the end of the semester, which resulted in slightly more than 50 participants per condition.
One hundred seventy-one undergraduates participated in the initial study. Of those who participated, 151 completed the study: 50 in the RCJ condition, 51 in the JOL condition, and 50 in the no-judgment condition. Data collection for the exact replication began immediately after completion of the initial study. No modifications were made between the two studies. One hundred seventy-five undergraduates participated in the replication, 160 of whom completed the study: 52 in the RCJ condition, 55 in the JOL condition, and 53 in the no-judgment condition. The participants who did not complete the studies either experienced computer errors or chose to stop of their own volition.
Materials
The MRC Psycholinguistics Database (Wilson, 1988) was used to create 450 word pairs. Words were limited to four-to eight-letter, one-or two-syllable nouns with familiarity, concreteness, and imageability ratings above 640, 410, and 410, respectively. From the words that fit this criteria, 900 were selected, with the constraint that the first three letters of all words were different. The words were randomly matched into pairs, and 56 of the pairs were randomly selected to serve as the target word pairs. The remaining word pairs went into a pool, where they could be selected for the practice and distractor trials.
Design and procedure
The study had a between-subjects design with three conditions: RCJ, JOL, and no judgment. The design of this study was based on the design used by Dougherty et al. (2005) , which utilized PRAM methodology (Nelson et al., 2004) . This type of design requires participants to engage in recall of target words immediately preceding their metacognitive confidence judgments, in order to eliminate the effects of covert retrieval attempts with some types of judgments. The study consisted of five phases that were repeated 14 times each in four blocks. All stimuli were programmed and presented with PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007 (Peirce, , 2009 . Before the experiment began, participants completed practice trials of the first four phases, 4 times each. The design of the study can be seen in Figure 2 .
Study phase. In the study phase, four to six word pairs were presented on the screen one at a time, and participants were instructed to study the pairs so that they would be able to recall the second word when presented with the first. Participants were instructed to study all word pairs; however, they were tested only on the target word pairs appearing as one of the first three word pairs. The remaining word pairs served as distractors. Presenting a variable number of distractor pairs before the target word pair prevented participants from identifying which word pair they would be tested on. The number of pretarget distractor pairs was randomly determined for each set. Three distractors were always presented after the target word pair, which allowed for a consistent delay between encoding and retrieval of the target word pairs. Because the number of distractors before the target word pair was randomly A visual representation of the procedure in one block. Participants first completed a study phase, in which they saw a series of word pairs. One of these pairs was the target (highlighted here in yellow), and the rest were distractors. Then, participants completed prejudgment recall, in which they were shown the first word of the target pair and asked to supply the second. In the following phase, participants made a metacognitive judgment-either a judgment of learning or a retrospective confidence judgment-indicating how confident they were in their response (or selected a random number between 1 and 6). After this, they were asked whether or not they would restudy this word pair if given the opportunity. In the last phase, participants were asked to recall the second word from all target word pairs and from a random selection of nontarget pairs from the study phase (highlighted here with a red border).
determined for each set, the total number of studied word pairs could vary from 224 to 336. All participants, however, studied the same 56 target word pairs regardless of the number of distractors. All word pairs were presented for 5 s each. (For purposes described in Section A of the Supplemental Material available online, a dot-probe task was also included on 20% of the study trials).
Prejudgment recall.
Immediately following the presentation of the last distractor item in each set, participants were presented with the first word of the target pair and instructed to type the second word. All recall was self-paced, and participants were required to respond to all prompts. The recalled word was counted as correct if the first three letters typed by the participant matched the first three letters of the target word (cf. Dougherty et al., 2005) . As described in the Materials section, all words were uniquely identifiable by their first three letters.
Metacognitive judgment. Immediately following prejudgment recall, participants made a metacognitive judgment regarding their confidence in their response (1 = low confidence, 6 = high confidence). There were three metacognitive conditions. Participants in the RCJ condition responded to the following question: "How likely is it that you retrieved the correct word during the recall test?" Participants in the JOL condition made a delayed JOL, responding to the following question: "How likely would you be to retrieve the word again on a future recall test at the end of the study?" Participants in the nojudgment condition did not make a metacognitive judgment but were told to select a random number between 1 and 6 to keep the task as similar as possible to the other conditions. All participants responded by typing their responses on the keyboard.
Restudy judgment. After making their metacognitive judgment, participants made their restudy judgment. Participants were asked "If given the opportunity, would you choose to restudy this item?" Participants made a binary decision by selecting either 1 ("yes restudy") or 0 ("no restudy") on the keyboard. Although participants were asked whether they would choose to restudy a word pair during the restudy judgment, no restudy opportunities were provided.
Final recall. After participants completed the study, prejudgment recall, metacognitive judgments, and restudy judgments for all 14 sets in a block, they completed final recall for all target word pairs and 14 randomly selected distractor word pairs. As in prejudgment recall, participants completed a self-paced cued-recall task by typing in their responses. Again, the recalled word was counted as correct if the first three letters typed by the participant matched the first three letters of the target word. After completing final recall, participants completed two questionnaires measuring their strategy use and mind wandering (see Section B in the Supplemental Material for further details).
Results
Data from the initial study and replication study were analyzed both separately and combined using the default Bayes factor (BF) t test (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) , with proportion data transformed using the logit transformation. The BF indexes the degree to which the data support any particular model (including the null model). Subscripts indicate whether they express evidence for the alternative hypothesis (BF 10 ) or the null hypothesis (BF 01 ). Metacognitive accuracy was assessed at the individual subject level by computing a rank order correlation between a participant's recall accuracy and his or her corresponding confidence judgments. Kendall's τ was also used as an index of the accuracy of restudy decisions. We chose Kendall's τ-b as the correlation coefficient, as opposed to the Goodman-Kruskal γ correlation on the basis of the findings of Masson and Rotello (2009) illustrating that γ is systematically biased. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that all conclusions based on the use of τ are consistent with those based on γ. Although we focus our exposition on the results of the combined analyses, results from the separate analyses are included in the tables. There were no meaningful differences in the overall percentage of correct responses across the three conditions for either prejudgment recall (RCJ = 56.4%, JOL = 51.7%, no judgment = 50.4%) or final recall (RCJ = 41.2%, JOL = 41.0%, no judgment = 35.7%), with strong support for the null hypothesis (BF 10 s = 0.16, 0.10). However, there was overwhelming evidence that RCJs were more correlated than were JOLs with prejudgment recall (BF 10 = 6299017.0; see Table 1 ), a finding that is consistent with prior studies and supports the assertion that RCJs should provide a more accurate basis for restudy decisions (Dougherty et al., 2005; Hines et al., 2009; Ryals et al., 2016; Wattier & Collins, 2011) . There was also modest support for the correlation between confidence judgments and final recall being higher for RCJs than for JOLs (BF 10 = 4.42). Although both RCJs and delayed JOLs were accurate predictors of future recall, RCJs were more accurate. Figure 3 plots the conditional confidence distributions. As in prior research, the distributions for both RCJs and JOLs for incorrect prejudgment recall were highly positively skewed. In contrast, the distribution for correctly retrieved items differed; RCJs showed a negative skew, and JOLs showed a uniform distribution. This finding is important because we assume that the same information used to make confidence judgments also provided the basis for restudy decisions. However, did type of confidence judgment (RCJ vs. JOL) affect restudy decisions as predicted?
As shown in Table 2 , there is convincing evidence that the correlation between restudy decisions and final recall was greater for the RCJ condition than the JOL condition (BF 10 = 9,668.76). Restudy decisions were also better correlated with prejudgment recall in the RCJ condition (mean τ = -0.33) compared with the JOL condition (mean τ = 0.03). These patterns suggest that participants in the RCJ condition should be better able to discriminate between those items that would benefit from restudy and those items that would not. This was indeed the case, as shown in Table 3 . Participants in the JOL condition chose to restudy more items (55.4%) that had been retrieved correctly at prejudgment recall, compared with participants in the RCJ condition (29.0%). This pattern also held for final recall: Participants in the JOL condition chose to restudy more items (61.3%) than participants in the RCJ condition (26.1%) that were ultimately correctly retrieved at final recall. For items incorrectly retrieved at prejudgment or final recall, the difference in the percentage of restudy decisions between the RCJ and JOL conditions was not meaningful. Note that RCJs were more strongly correlated with restudy decisions (τ = −0.36) than were JOLs (τ = 0.04), which suggests that participants in the RCJ condition based their restudy decisions on the same information used to make confidence judgments, whereas participants in the JOL condition did not. We return to this issue in the Exploratory Analyses section. The next question of interest is whether either of the judgment conditions differed from the no-judgment condition, which may reflect the restudy decision behaviors participants made naturally. Table 3 provides the mean percentage of items that participants chose to restudy, separately for items that were correctly recalled and not correctly recalled in all three groups. Ideally, participants should choose to restudy only those items that were incorrectly retrieved at prejudgment recall or ultimately were incorrectly retrieved at final recall. Though participants in both the RCJ and no-judgment conditions generally chose to restudy fewer of the items they correctly retrieved, compared with participants in the JOL condition, the data were inconclusive in regard to other comparisons with the no-judgment condition. Note, however, that participants in the JOL condition chose to restudy more items (M = 29.77) than participants in the RCJ (M = 22.37, BF 10 = 11.93) and no-judgment (M = 22.63, BF 10 = 6.59) conditions. Table 4 provides the mean percentage of restudied and not restudied items that were incorrectly recalled during final recall. If restudy decisions accurately capture which items would benefit from restudy, then participants should have more retrieval errors for items they chose to restudy. Although there was no difference between the RCJ (77.5%) and no-judgment (71.4%) conditions, participants in both of these conditions had more difficulty recalling items they had chosen to restudy, compared with participants in the JOL condition (57.3%). On the other hand, among items that were not selected for restudy, incorrect recall was lower in the RCJ condition (49.1%) compared with both the JOL (62.1%) and no-judgment (61.2%) conditions. There was no difference in incorrect recall between the JOL and no-judgment conditions when items were not selected for restudy.
Exploratory Analyses
Given the striking differences between participants who made JOLs and those who made RCJs, we ran a number of follow-up exploratory analyses to identify potential explanations for these large discrepancies. These analyses were not part of our original analysis plan. The analysis approach involved policy-capturing methodology. This methodology is used in judgment and decision-making research to identify how people utilize cues in decision-making contexts, as conceptualized within Brunswik's (1956) lens model (Dougherty & Thomas, 2012; Hammond, McClelland, & Mumpower, 1980; Hammond, Rohrbaugh, Mumpower, & Adelman, 1977; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) . For our purposes, we used a variant of the maximum rank correlation estimator (Han, 1987) developed by Dougherty and Thomas (2012; see also Tidwell, Dougherty, Chrabaszcz, & Thomas, 2017) called general monotone modeling (GeMM) to estimate regression parameters at the individual subject level. GeMM is a semiparametric regression procedure in which regression parameters are estimated by maximizing Kendall's τ. The approach is nonparametric both in terms of the assumed functional form and in terms of the error distribution, and it has been shown to be a general regression procedure that Note: Median effect sizes were estimated from the posterior distribution; 95% credible intervals for these effect sizes are given in brackets. RCJ = retrospective confidence judgment; JOL = judgment of learning; BF 10 = Bayes factor referring to the amount of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there is a difference between the RCJ and JOL conditions. encompasses a variety of parametric procedures as special cases, including ordinary least squares, the Box-Cox model, and logistic regression (see Han, 1987; Tidwell et al., 2017) . In our application of GeMM to policy capturing, we estimated the degree to which participants' confidence judgments and restudy decisions were predicted by prejudgment-recall accuracy and latency. Both of these variables are valid indices of future recall success, as one would expect that the probability of accuracy at final recall should increase as a function of accuracy at prejudgment recall and decrease as a function of the latency of prejudgment recall (i.e., more slowly recalled items should have a lower probability of being recalled later). Figure 4a plots the mean standardized regression parameters and 95% confidence intervals when [-0.33, 0.40] Note: Median effect sizes were estimated from the posterior distribution; 95% credible intervals for these effect sizes are given in brackets. RCJ = retrospective confidence judgment; JOL = judgment of learning; BF 10 = Bayes factor referring to the amount of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there is a difference between the RCJ and JOL conditions. prejudgment-recall accuracy and response time (RT) were used to predict confidence judgments. As can be seen, the regression parameters for both the JOL and RCJ conditions differ from zero, which suggests that participants in both conditions used these two cues when making their confidence judgments. Predictably, regression parameters for participants in the no-judgment condition did not differ from zero. Figure 4b plots the mean standardized regression parameters (with 95% confidence intervals) for prejudgment-recall accuracy and RT when predicting restudy decisions. Surprisingly, participants in the JOL condition appeared to completely disregard prejudgment-recall accuracy and RT when making restudy decisions, as evidenced by the fact that the regression parameters did not differ from zero. This contrasts with the RCJ condition, in which both regression parameters differed significantly from zero: Participants in the RCJ condition were less likely to select items for restudy that were correctly recalled and more likely to select items that were recalled more slowly. Interestingly, participants in the no-judgment condition appeared to utilize prejudgment-recall RT (but not prejudgment-recall accuracy) when making their restudy decisions.
Discussion
We tested whether having participants make RCJs would improve specific item-restudy decisions relative to having participants make delayed JOLs. We found that by orienting participants to focus on past retrieval success, participants in the RCJ condition were better able to discriminate among items that would benefit from additional study and items that were already sufficiently learned to be retrieved at final test. Participants in the JOL condition decided to restudy 26% more items that had been recalled correctly at prejudgment recall, compared with participants in the RCJ condition, whereas there were no between-conditions differences in decisions related to items recalled incorrectly. This pattern was even more pronounced for final recall, in which participants in the JOL condition chose to restudy 31% more of the items that they ultimately correctly retrieved at final study. This suggests that having participants make RCJs improves their ability to identify what not to restudy, compared with when participants make JOLs. Contrary to expectations, however, neither judgment condition was consistently better than the nojudgment condition: Restudy decisions made with no metacognitive judgments were comparable with those in the RCJ condition and better than those in the JOL condition. Analysis of the predictors of confidence judgments and restudy decisions suggests that having participants make different types of judgments ( JOLs vs. RCJs) affects the information that is used when deciding which items to restudy. Although both JOLs and RCJs appeared to be based on accuracy and RT during prejudgment recall, the relation was stronger for participants in the RCJ than in the JOL condition. The use of this information when making metacognitive judgments is consistent with previous research showing that when other information is not available, memory for past test and retrieval fluency are heavily relied on when making delayed JOLs (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Koriat & Ma'ayan, 2005) . Interestingly, it appeared as though participants in the JOL condition completely disregarded both prejudgment recall and RT when making restudy decisions. This may seem surprising given the vast amount of past research suggesting that JOLs can be used to effectively guide study behavior; however, when empirically tested, improvements in metacognitive judgments do not always lead to improvements in effective restudy decisions (Kimball, Smith, & Muntean, 2012) . When retrieval accuracy was not directly assessed, as in the no-judgment condition, participants appeared to make restudy decisions on the basis of retrieval fluency of the prejudgment recall. Only participants in the RCJ condition continued to incorporate both prejudgment recall and prejudgment recall RT into their restudy decisions.
We suggest that having participants make RCJs focuses their attention on the current status of an item in memory (its current retrievability) and increases the use of predictive cues in formulating restudy decisions. Our findings challenge conventional wisdom that JOLs are well suited for enhancing metacognitive control over learning and suggest that having participants instead focus on past retrieval success (using RCJs) can nudge them toward more optimal restudy decisions. That said, much more work is needed to evaluate the generality of the findings across both different stimuli and longer-retention intervals and to assess whether RCJs impact overall learning when participants are given an opportunity to carry out their restudy decisions. Many studies have shown that JOLs lead to increased learning outcomes, and our current work does not contradict these findings, as participants in the JOL condition selected items for restudy that they retrieved incorrectly (the most likely source of improvement). However, the question becomes whether learning can be increased even more with RCJs as participants will spend less study time reviewing material that is already learned.
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